Causal Simulation Theory: An Intergrative Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Causal Reasoning

Abstract

We review the cognitive and neural foundations of causal reasoning and assess contemporary psychological theories based on force dynamic (Barbey & Wolff, 2007; submitted), causal model (Sloman, Barbey & Hotaling, 2008), and mental model representations (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Johnson-Laird & Goldvarg-Steingold, 2007). We identify limitations of each framework and propose a broader, more pluralistic theory designed to incorporate the virtues of each approach. We propose that causal reasoning depends on causal simulations of the modality-specific states underlying causal events, and draw conclusions about the importance of causal simulations for (i) representing key elements of the force dynamic, causal model, and mental model frameworks, (ii) capturing central properties these theories fail to represent (i.e., concerning perception, action, affect, and interoception), and (iii) dynamically shifting between these representations to support a broader, more comprehensive theory of causal reasoning.