Equilibrium Solution To the Lowest Unique Positive Integer Game

by Seung Ki Baek, Sebastian Bernhardsson
Fluctuation and Noise Letters ()
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Abstract

We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved even for a small number of players, which has hindered a precise analysis in previous works. We here present a systematic way to reach the solution for a general number of players, and show that this game is an example of conflict between the group and the individual interests.

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