Implicit person theories influence memory judgments: The circumstances under which metacognitive knowledge is used

Abstract

This work focuses on the influence of implicit theories on recognition judgments. We argue that to understand how a recognition task is solved, it is necessary to study inferential processes because individuals might use their metamnestic knowledge ('I would have known that!') as a basis for replacing missing recollective experiences with inferential processes (Strack & Bless, 1994). In the present study, individuals' preexisting implicit personality theory (Dweck, 1996) was measured and was identified as a moderating variable for the use of metamnestic knowledge. After participants had studied word lists their metamnestic knowledge concerning these lists was manipulated. The results of a subsequent recognition task revealed that individuals used these metacognitively based inferences only when they assumed personal stability ('entity theory'). Participants who believed in personal variability ('incremental theory') did not draw similar inferences when recollective experiences were missing. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.