Understanding the Intelligence Practices of State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies

Abstract

State, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies play a critical role in securing the homeland, and understanding and improving the intelligence practices of these agencies will enhance public safety. Better intelligence must be collected, analyzed, and shared, but little is known about the intelligence practices of SLT agencies. This project addresses these gaps. Specifically, we examine the experiences of SLT agencies and fusion centers for building an intelligence capacity, understand critical gaps in the sharing of information regarding intelligence, and identify obstacles related to other key intelligence issues, such as measuring performance and communication between agencies. In addition, we examine the activities of three fusion centers to identify strategies that appear to be successful in increasing the information flow across agencies, the major obstacles of effective intelligence gathering and information sharing, and to identify key practices for integrating domestic intelligence into the information sharing environment and overcoming these obstacles. Our research design consisted of two methodologies. First, we conducted a national survey of SLT agencies with two different samples. Our first sample consisted of personnel responsible for establishing state fusion centers and thus was critically involved in building the state-level intelligence infrastructure. The second sample was comprised of state, local, and tribal personnel charged with building an intelligence capacity in different sized agencies in all regions of the country. Second, we conducted three fusion center (FC) case studies. The data collection strategy for the case studies included compiling and analyzing open source documents, and then conducting interviews with key informants. Our focus was on examining how local, street-level intelligence is managed and brought into the intelligence process to prevent terrorist incidents and to address a variety of criminal threats. Although there are a large number of important findings discussed in this report, there are several highlighted here. First, although significant progress has been made post-9/11 installing fundamental policy and procedures related to building the intelligence capacity of law enforcement, there is significant room for improvement and a need to move agencies forward to be consistent with key requirements. Second, fusion centers are farther along instituting policies and practices than individual law enforcement agencies, most likely because there has been an extensive focus on developing fusion center operations and expertise by both the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice. Third, both samples of respondents stressed that they have worked at building relationships with a diverse range of agencies, but they also indicated that they are not completely satisfied with these relationships. Fourth, there is an overwhelming amount of information going into and out of these agencies, and it is likely, without having enough analysts within the organization or analysts not effectively trained to process this information, that there are missed opportunities for strategic and tactical understanding of homeland security and criminal threats. Fifth, assessing performance of analysts is quite difficult but respondents highlighted the need to focus on the quality of strategic and tactical products produced. Sixth, an analysis of the types of products produced and analytical procedures used on a daily basis also highlighted some of the differences in the intelligence mission of state, local, tribal law enforcement agencies and fusion centers. Specifically, fusion centers were more likely to be fostering information sharing connections, conducting a greater range of different types of analysis, and working with public health and other hazards-related data on a daily basis. Seventh, the SLT and FC respondents noted considerable variation in access to formal communication systems. Because of the DHS and DOJ explicit focus on developing fusion centers, it should not be surprising that the centers have more access to data bases and networks than do individual law enforcement agencies. Finally, the case studies provide valuable insights into some of the best practices of fusion centers, but also indicated that these centers are works in progress constantly having to adapt to rapid changes in their external environment.