Revenue and cannibalization: The effect of interchangeable design confronted remanufacturing processing

Abstract

Traditional wisdom suggests that the interchangeable design in process system engineer-ing, such as modularity or commonality design, can lower the manufacturing cost and act as a revenue driver. Moreover, the interchangeable design will be efficient in both assembling for new production and disassembling for remanufacturing. As such, interchangeable design confronted re-manufacturing processing often involves a balance of revenue from cost drivers and cannibalization effects from remanufacturing. Therefore, this paper studies how the original equipment manufac-turers’ (OEMs’) interchangeable design impacts the remanufacturing decisions, as well as the econ-omy and environment. Specifically, we develop two theoretical models, in which an OEM makes a strategic choice relating to design interchangeability when the remanufacturing operations are un-dertaken by itself (Model O) or outsourced to third-party remanufacturers (Model T). This study finds that, although the optimal level of interchangeability related to the product design in Model T is lower than that in Model O, the optimal quantity of remanufactured products in the latter scenario is always higher. This suggests that remanufacturing outsourcing deters the OEM’s strategic choice on design interchangeability, which may be consistent with the fact that Lexmark makes its products less interchangeable to avoid remanufacturing from third-party remanufacturers (TPRs). Conversely, although the OEM is always less likely to outsource its remanufacturing operations to independent remanufacturers, remanufacturing outsourcing may be more beneficial for the envi-ronment, industry, and society. These key insights on the environmental groups or agencies suggest that remanufacturing outsourcing may be more beneficial for the environment, industry, and society and depends on the OEMs’ attitudes towards its profitability loss. Furthermore, to eliminate the above contrasting effects between the OEMs’ profitability and other issues, two possible remedies, including a revenue-sharing contract and subsidy-incentive mechanism, are provided to achieve a “win-win” situation.