Intuition in contemporary philosophy

Abstract

Rightly or wrongly, discussion of intuitions, and especially of the role of intuitions in philosophy, has dominated much 21st-century metaphilosophical theorizing. It is widely (but not wholly) agreed that the “standard philosophical methodology” (whatever that is) is one that affords a central role to “intuitions” (whatever those are). As a result, a significant proportion of the literature that sets out to evaluate whether the methods of traditional analytic philosophy are good ones is focused on the question of whether the widely perceived reliance on intuition is legitimate: critics of traditional philosophical methods often attack the use of intuitions; defenders of traditional methods often defend the use of intuitions. Perhaps you suspect by inference from my tone that I am not wholly convinced in the truth of the assumption that intuitions do play central roles in traditional philosophical methods. You are correct: I have my doubts. I expect that the contemporary focus on intuitions has exaggerated their importance in traditional philosophical methods, as actually practiced by traditional philosophers. I am by no means alone in my skepticism; although a perception of the importance of intuitions for standard methods is justly deserving of the title of orthodoxy, it has recently become increasingly fashionable to call this orthodoxy into question.