We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately efficient and approximately budget-balanced. Our results show that one important and natural case of multicast cost sharing is an example of a canonical hard problem in distributed, algorithmic mechanism design; in this sense, they represent progress toward the development of a complexity theory of Internet computation. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Feigenbaum, J., Krishnamurthy, A., Sami, R., & Shenker, S. (2003). Hardness results for multicast cost sharing. Theoretical Computer Science, 304(1–3), 215–236. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3975(03)00085-9