Submentalizing: Clarifying How Domain General Processes Explain Spontaneous Perspective-Taking

Abstract

Demonstrations of spontaneous perspective-taking are thought to provide some of the best evidence to date for “implicit mentalizing”—the ability to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner. However, this evidence has been challenged by a “submentalizing” account proposing that these findings are merely attention-orienting effects. The present research aimed to clarify the cognitive processes responsible by measuring spontaneous perspective-taking while controlling for attention orienting. Four experiments employed the widely used dot perspective task, modified by changing the order that stimuli were presented so that responses would be less influenced by attention orienting. This modification had different effects on speed and accuracy of responding. For response times, it attenuated spontaneous perspective-taking effects for avatars as well as attention-orienting effects for arrows. For error rates, robust spontaneous perspectivetaking effects remained that were unaffected by manipulations targeting attention orienting, but contingent upon there being two competing active task sets (self- and other perspectives). These results confirm that attention orienting explains response time effects revealed by the original version of the dot perspective task. Error rate results also reveal the crucial role played by domain-general executive processes in enabling selection between perspectives. The absence of independent evidence for implicit mentalizing lends support to a revised submentalizing account that incorporates executive functions alongside attention orienting.