Skip to main content

Truth “after postmodernism”: Wittgenstein and postfoundationalism in philosophy of education

Citations of this article
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text


In a range of path-breaking publications that shaped his engagement with educational theory Paul Smeyers sympathetically investigated the claims and ‘atmosphere’ of postmodernism. In this chapter I investigate the backlash against postmodernism that holds it responsible for ‘post-truth politics,’ and of promoting a cynical attitude to truth and facts. I argue for an intellectual history of truth in which it is contested, not only in Continental tradition and in what some have called postmodernism, but also in the analytic tradition. I explore these issues through a reading of Wittgenstein’s place and role in the history of analytic philosophy and by investigating how he moves away from a notion of truth grounded in a form foundationalism in the Tractatus to embrace a form of anti-foundationalism in the Investigations and On Certainty.




Peters, M. A. (2018). Truth “after postmodernism”: Wittgenstein and postfoundationalism in philosophy of education. In Past, Present, and Future Possibilities for Philosophy and History of Education: Finding Space and Time for Research (pp. 89–100). Springer International Publishing.

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free