Pricing Decisions in Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Competitive Fairness-Concerned Collectors

Abstract

Based on the Shapley value fairness concern framework, a fairness concern utility system is established for the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with one manufacturer, one retailer, and two competitive collectors. Under the five models (one centralized and four decentralized), the influence of competitive strength and fairness concern degree of collectors on the pricing decisions is analyzed. The following conclusions can be obtained: (1) When the manufacturer considers the fairness concern of the collectors, fairness concern is a way for the collectors to obtain more profit. Whether the manufacturer "proactively"considers the fairness concern of the collectors is an approach to benefiting the collectors but only in the case of "active"consideration, there is less self-loss to the manufacturer. (2) When the collectors' fairness concern cannot be considered by the manufacturer, the equilibrium recycling price sets lower for the purpose of achieving more profit by the collectors. At this point, the profit of the collectors and the manufacturer is the lowest, and so is the return rate of the CLSC. (3) When the collectors do not care about whether they are being fairly treated but the manufacturer "actively"takes the fairness of the collectors into consideration, the collectors get "unexpected"attention from the manufacturer, which makes the performance of the collectors more positive than it is when their fairness concerns are taken into account. The profit increased by the collectors is more than that lost by the manufacturer, so the profit of the CLSC is the largest. Additionally, our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision in the case where the collectors consider fairness concern.