Blockchain in the Agri Food Supply Chain: A Game Theoretical Approach for a Strategic Solution to Information Asymmetry

Abstract

The increasing complexity of global agri food supply chains has exacerbated the issue of information asym metry, undermining trust among stakeholders and compromising transparency in production processes. In such a fragmented and opaque ecosystem, the ability to access reliable, veriϐiable information becomes not just a compet itive advantage but a necessity for the sustainability, accountability, and resilience of the entire agri food supply chain. This study explores the potential of blockchain technology as a strategic tool to mitigate such asymmetries by developing a formal model grounded in evolutionary game theory. The model simulates the strategic interac tions between supply chain actors, speciϐically, the choice to cooperate by sharing truthful information or to defect by concealing or falsifying it, within a blockchain enabled environment. By employing a two strategy replicator dynamic, the research identiϐies the conditions under which cooperation becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy. The ϐindings suggest that the introduction of blockchain, combined with targeted incentives and credible penal ties, signiϐicantly increases the likelihood of cooperative behavior. Simulations reveal that the implementation of blockchain, when combined with appropriate incentive and penalty mechanisms, signiϐicantly reduces tendencies toward data concealment or falsiϐication. The ϐindings also highlight the pivotal role of blockchain in fostering inter organizational trust, enhancing traceability, and promoting sustainable practices throughout the value chain. The and strengthening the resilience of the agri food sector.