In this paper, the first in PSNA Working Paper Series, the author demonstrates that we are now entering an era when nuclear deterrence as a security measure is ineffective, by taking an example of the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization talks. Unlike in the Cold War era, the international society has become more interconnected, and each country’s economy is dependent on that of other countries. Destroying another nation through war is now the equivalent of destroying part of one’s own economic foundation. The current concern, therefore, is not the physical destruction of the world due to nuclear retaliation by the United States or China, but rather “mutually assured economic destruction” in which the global economy becomes dysfunctional. However, even if it is now apparent that a war option is not viable, Japan still sticks to US extended nuclear deterrence. The author examines why and how disadvantageous it is for Japan to continue to rely on nuclear deterrence to defend against the threat of North Korea. If it is possible to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program through negotiation and giving incentives, it would demonstrate that an approach other than deterrence could be successful.
CITATION STYLE
Yanagisawa, K. (2019). The North Korea–United States Summit and Possibilities for New Security-Oriented Thinking. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1592708
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.