Intersectionality without Fragmentation

6Citations
Citations of this article
12Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

Feminist philosophers have long worried that intersectionality undermines the viability of the concept and category of woman, thereby undermining feminist theory and politics. Some have responded to this problem by abandoning intersectionality; others have attempted to find some suitably inclusive way of reconceptualizing woman. I provide a novel solution that focuses on conceptualizing oppression in light of intersectionality, rather than trying to provide an account of what it is to be a woman. By enabling us to understand feminism as responding to gender oppression, this account shows that intersectionality does not conceptually undermine and fragment feminism. Feminism should be intersectional.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Martín, A. (2024). Intersectionality without Fragmentation. Ethics, 134(2), 214–245. https://doi.org/10.1086/727271

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free