Book Chapter

Nominalism, the nonexistence of mathematical objects

Springer International Publishing, (2015), 133-145
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-21473-3_7
0Citations
Citations of this article
1Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

Nominalism is the view that, despite appearances, there are no mathematical entities. The ways that nominalism is both compatible with there being mathematical truths and falsehoods, and compatible with mathematical truths being valuable in scientific applications are explored in this paper. Some of the purely psychological reasons for why nominalism is so hard to believe in will also be discussed.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Azzouni, J. (2015). Nominalism, the nonexistence of mathematical objects. In Mathematics, Substance and Surmise: Views on the Meaning and Ontology of Mathematics (pp. 133–145). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21473-3_7

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free