The passions of Christ constitute a centerpiece of the Christian narrative, which itself forms the backdrop for much of early modern thought. This paper focuses on Christ's suffering as the point at which passions, reason, and cognition collide. It explores the components of that collision and examines how Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Anne Finch Conway (1631-79) respond to them. Late medieval and early modern art frames the discussion. Works of sculpture, like the Roettgen Pietà, and paintings, like Matthias Grünewald's Isenheim Altarpiece, suggest that cognitive benefits result from recognizing suffering as part of the order of things. The paper summarizes the thought of Conway and Leibniz in this context. It describes their rationalism and their commitment to a radical ecumenicalism, according to which partial knowledge of the divine is available to everyone, regardless of religion. It then focuses on the moral and cognitive benefits of suffering. For Conway, such benefits come from suffering itself. For Leibniz, they follow from what is learned in the transition from a state of suffering to one of non-suffering. In the end, Leibnitz and Conway believe that suffering contributes to moral development and that it assists in the acquisition of knowledge of important truths. © 2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston.
CITATION STYLE
Mercer, C. (2012). Knowledge and suffering in early modern philosophy: G.W. Leibniz and Anne Conway. In Emotional Minds: The Passions and the Limits of Pure Inquiry in Early Modern Philosophy (pp. 179–206). Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110260922.179
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