How Does Children’s Theory of Mind Become Explicit? A Review of Longitudinal Findings

Abstract

How does theory of mind become explicit? In this article, we provide a brief overview of theoretical accounts and then review longitudinal findings on the development of theory of mind from infancy to the preschool years. Long-term predictive relations among conceptually related measures of implicit and explicit theory-of-mind reasoning support a conceptual continuity view of the transition from an implicit to an explicit understanding of the mind. We discuss alternative, minimalist accounts of infant psychological reasoning (e.g., two-systems models, submentalizing theory) and their implications for the development of theory of mind in light of the evidence. Longitudinal findings further support a developmental enrichment view of joint attention as a foundation of theory of mind and early social interaction as a powerful mechanism in the development of this ability. Finally, we highlight the importance of longitudinal data for our understanding of conceptual development from infancy to the preschool years.