Epistemic Injustice in Finance

Abstract

This article applies philosophical work on epistemic injustice and cognate concepts (such as epistemic self-confidence) to study gender and racial disparity in financial markets. Members of disadvantaged groups often receive inferior financial services (they pay higher interest rates on loans, their loan applications are more likely to be rejected, etc.). In most jurisdictions, it is illegal to provide discriminatorily disparate treatment to groups defined by gender and skin colour. Racial disparity in financial services is generally considered to be discriminatory (and therefore illegal). The standard view among most regulators is that gender disparity is not discriminatory, though. Through an analysis of various exemplary cases, I propose testimonial injustice as a candidate explanation for some of the existing forms of racial disparity found in financial services. I show how prejudices about gender and finance decrease epistemic self-confidence, and how this leads to gender disparity. And I consider particularly intractable forms of self-fulfilling testimonial injustice.