Institutional Approaches to Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Comparative Analysis of Migration Frameworks

Abstract

The advancement of quantum computing is increasingly recognized as a significant threat to classical public-key cryptographic systems, triggering a global shift toward Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This article presents a topical survey and comparative analysis of the transition strategies adopted by leading cybersecurity agencies—including National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systémes d’Information (ANSSI), Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees (CRYPTREC), and European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). The technical foundations of standardized PQC algorithms (Module Lattice-Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), Module Lattice-Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), Fast-Fourier Lattice-based Compact Signatures over NTRU (FALCON), and Stateless Hashbased- Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA)) are reviewed, alongside a critical examination of hybrid cryptography, crypto-agility, and strategic alignment on standards and migration principles, despite jurisdictional differences in policy enforcement. The survey highlights shared priorities, such as phased implementation, backward compatibility, and risk mitigation via hybrid adoption. To enhance analytical depth, the study introduces the Institutional–Sectoral PQC Migration Convergence Framework, linking institutional pillars to sectoral readiness for reproducible comparative assessment. National strategies are shown to serve as potential roadmaps for global institutions, underscoring the importance of international coordination and adaptability. These insights support the development of secure, interoperable, and future-proof cryptographic infrastructures in the quantum era, operationalized via the proposed 10-step migration playbook.