Eurasian Great Power Triangle

Abstract

Can America afford to compete with two Eurasian great powers simultaneously? It clearly was able to act that way in the 1990s, at a time when Russia was weak and China not yet strong enough. Thus while building up its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, Washington encroached upon Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence in continental Eurasia. Enjoying its unipolar moment, the U.S. was not afraid of angering both Russia and China. This policy of confronting the two great powers is still largely in place to this day. The Ukraine crisis of 2013–2014 has only served to underscore the unresolved antagonism between Russia and the U.S.-led West. The battle over Ukraine, whatever its final outcome may be, will inevitably make Russia less “European” and more “Asian”, pushing it closer to China. To avoid a new edition of confrontational bipolarity, Washington, Moscow and Beijing must strive to reach at least some modicum of accommodation.