In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counterintuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of "revenue monotonicity" can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal-meaning roughly that it chooses allocations that cannot be augmented to cause a losing bidder to win without hurting winning bidders-and that allows bidders to express arbitrary known single-minded preferences. We also give a set of other impossibility results as corollaries, concerning revenue when the set of goods changes, false-name-proofness, and the core. 1 Crown Copyright © 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Rastegari, B., Condon, A., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2011). Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 175(2), 441–456. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005