Does Bipartisanship Pay? Executive Manipulation of Legislative Coalitions During the George W. Bush Presidency

Abstract

Signing statements have become a common tool used by modern presidents to manipulate the implementation of public policy. Most previous work assumes that the inter-branch environment explains the president's usage of these tools. Little attention is paid to how dynamics within Congress may affect the president's decision-making. I advance a theory of legislative bargaining, coalition formation, and strategic calculus by the president that reveals when, how, and why presidents issue these statements. I hypothesize that we should be more likely to see signing statements on bills that pass through Congress with bipartisan support and with large enacting coalitions, regardless of the inter-branch context. Further, I argue that the magnitude of the challenges in these statements should also vary with the legislative cohesion on a bill. I evaluate these hypotheses with data on signing statements from the George W. Bush administration and find strong support in favor of the claims.