Characterization, scope and difficulties of the "biological bases" of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Adhd). an approach from the philosophy of biology

Abstract

Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is among the most prevalent psychiatric disorders in children at present and, from biomedical and neurobiological areas, it is considered to have a biological basis. In the present work we analyzed from a philosophical approach, the discourses deployed from these investigations in order to detect and clarify various phenomenal, theoretical and ontological aspects that underlie it. In general terms, we have found that the conceptualization of ADHD is traversed by at least four different organizational levels: genetic-molecular (genes and proteins), tissue (parts of the brain), organ (brain as a whole) and the organismic (individual). These levels occupy very different roles; lower levels of organization occupying predominant explanatory roles as well as presenting the fundamental entities in ontological terms. In turn, the neuroscientific discourse presents biases related to the loss of consideration of heterogeneity, the omission of levels superior to organismic and simplifications of the genetic-molecular domain and the genotype-phenotype relation. Thus, the type of simplifying inquiry in the lower levels of the biological hierarchy seems to show more difficulties than successes, and epistemically shows cracks that are not settled.