The recent turn in analytical sociology: The dismissal of general theories, mental states, and analytic philosophy – and the old issue of mechanism explanations

Abstract

Analytical sociology is a sociological approach whose advocates share two methodological doctrines: sociology should be a rigorous discipline and focus on action-based explanations of social processes. This article analyzes some recent methodological innovations of analytical sociology: (1) it is proposed to abandon general theories, in particular rational choice theory. We raise several objections against this claim. The major argument for applying general theories is that an empirical comparison with middle range theories implies conditions for their modification and at the same time tests the general theory. Another flaw of the critique of rational choice theory is that the target is not a wide ‘bounded rationality’ version that is increasingly applied in the social sciences. Instead, an outdated narrow version is attacked; (2) a new demand is to give up explanations with mental states such as goals and beliefs and focus on situational factors. It is argued that this leads to false explanations because the impact of situational factors on action depends on mental states. Omitting mental states thus leads to invalid explanations; (3) a major unresolved issue is the thesis that mechanism explanations are a special kind of explanation that do not need to apply theories. It is shown why this demand is mistaken.