Egalitarian committee scoring rules

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Abstract

We introduce and study the class of egalitarian variants of committee scoring rules, where instead of summing up the scores that voters assign to committees-as is done in the utilitarian variants-the score of a committee is taken to be the lowest score assigned to it by any voter. We focus on five rules, which are egalitarian analogues of SNTV, the k-Borda rule, the Chamberlin-Courant rule, the Bloc rule, and the Pessimist rule. We establish their computational complexity, provide their initial axiomatic study, and perform experiments to represent the action of these rules graphically.

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APA

Aziz, H., Faliszewski, P., Grofman, B., Slinko, A., & Talmon, N. (2018). Egalitarian committee scoring rules. In IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 2018-July, pp. 56–62). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/8

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