Preferences for consensus and majoritarian democracy: Long-and short-Term influences

1Citations
Citations of this article
4Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

This article analyzes individuals' preferences for a consensus or a majoritarian type of democracy. We theorize that variation in these preferences is a function of both institutional learning (long term) and individuals' position as a political minority or majority (short term). First, as a result of institutional learning, we expect that individuals living in democracies characterized by coalition governments will favor consensus democracy. Conversely, those living in countries characterized by single-party executives will favor majoritarian democracy. Second, we expect that individuals' position as an electoral minority or majority will affect these beliefs. Those who vote for small parties will favor a consensus democracy, while those who vote for large parties will support a majoritarian system. However, whether institutional learning or individuals' position as a political minority or majority prevail in influencing these preferences about the ideal model of democracy will be a function of the democratic trajectory of each country. We test these arguments drawing on data from the European Social Survey.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Ferrín, M., & Hernández, E. (2021). Preferences for consensus and majoritarian democracy: Long-and short-Term influences. European Political Science Review, 13(2), 209–225. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773921000047

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free