Managerial Incentives and Firm Risk Taking: The Mediating Role of Corporate Social Responsibility

Abstract

In this study, we focus on managerial incentives provided by debt-like compensation and further investigate whether and to what extent such managerial incentives may affect CEOs’ decisions on risk management. Building on cumulative prospect theory and instrumental stakeholder theory, we propose that CEOs tend to have risk-reduction incentives if they are paid with debt in their own firms, and that firm engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities can mediate the relationship between debt-like compensation and firm risk taking. In addition, we posit that the mediated relationship between CEO debt-like compensation and firm risk taking is contingent, and we propose environmental dynamism and munificence as two such contingencies that moderate the mediated process. Using a large longitudinal dataset of nonfinancial U.S. firms, we document strong supportive evidence for these hypotheses.