Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength

  • Erbas S
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Abstract

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. Institutional transparency makes future contingencies more easily predictable for investors. Greater transparency can be achieved through vertical and horizontal integration of policy rules, which may result in lower Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity). In a model based on cumulative prospect theory, for a given probability and payoff structure, expected return on investment is higher in more transparent countries; therefore, those countries attract more investment and grow faster than less transparent countries. Lower transparency may result in inherently higher volatility.

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APA

Erbas, S. N. (2004). Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength. IMF Working Papers, 04(115), 1. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451853896.001

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