Consciousness: from the perspective of the dynamical systems theory

Abstract

Beings, animate or inanimate, are dynamical systems that continuously interact with the (external and/or internal) environment through the physical or physiologic interfaces of their Kantian (representational) realities. And the nature of their reactions is determined by their systems' inner workings. It is from this perspective that this work attempts to address some of the long held philosophical questions; major one among them consciousness, in the context of the physicality of such systems. And to this end, the approach relies upon the appropriate governing mathematical formalisms of system's operations (behavior): For higher beings, the concept of the computational brain 1-3 provides the necessary insights into the likely mathematical processes which must be behind the operations of the system. For inanimate matter, the process is gravely simpler: the responses to environmental (initial and boundary) conditions (inputs) are governed by its field equation (constitutive properties, and constitutive and conservation laws), which render physical changes, which are the expressions (outputs) some of which may appear on their interfaces with their external environment. In the former, that is the case of the higher beings, their systems' operations are generally very complex and inevitably would involve brain (computed) solutions of discerned complexities (from sense organ inputs) and streaming downloads of the results (perceptions/ conceptions outputs), through the nervous system, to the body physiologic interfaces, for their expressions. The latter expressions are animate functions and characteristics such as biological sustenance; maintenance, behavior, thoughts and vocalizations; and the seemingly awareness of sentience, and other associated phenomena, which together define the consciousness, albeit with some reporting shortcoming due to interface display limitations. Prima facie, the genesis of the consciousness, from the view point of dynamic system theory,-being simply expressions of some of the results of their interaction with the environment-allows for the generalization of this phenomenon, which is considered only a higher animate peculiarity, to all matter with spatial representation,-animate or otherwise-granted with vast differences of the nature, and complexities of the related expressions, some of which in humans are referred to as the "experiences of consciousness." In such realm, consciousness is fundamental to all matter with objective and subjective aspects to it: the potential to react signifies the "objective consciousness;" and the nature of the reaction defines the "subjective consciousness." And it is the specificity of the latter, of whatever nature, which separates the animate from the inanimate existence. Within the laid out framework of the present theory, the big baffling question of philosophy, as well as how and where the human subjective experiences of consciousness happen, the hard problem, 4 find plausible answers: All aspects of human consciousness, are renditions of the results of some of the brain computed events (perceptions/conceptions),-in response to external and internal stimuli-by neural mechanisms, 5 as functions and expressions, in different modes, through various physiological body interfaces. In humans, the utterance interface displays two of the major components of consciousness of special interest to this work; the thought and the vision: they are certain streamed downloads of perceptions, which are expressed by this interface, 5 mostly inaudibly; though occasionally sounded off, as explanations and/or loud thinking. However, at times, the complexities of the thought and vision (download) contents,-likely involving an extensive Lexicon-render their occurring audible reporting deficient due to vocal instrument filtering. And this inevitable physiologic shortfall (caused by vocal frequency bandwidth limitation),-the incompleteness of the audible expressions of subjective consciousness-recognized as the hard problem, is very likely sanctioned by the evolutionary processes due to the absence of any survival value. This proposed system theory approach to the understanding of the human sentience and other facets of the brain (mind), follows and complements the (generally accepted) cognitive sciences reductionist (experimentally based) consensus of absence of free will.