Recovery is a commonly used concept in both professional and everyday contexts. Yet despite its extensive use, it has not drawn much philosophical attention. In this paper, I question the common understanding of recovery, show how the concept is inadequate, and introduce new and much needed terminology. I argue that recovery glosses over important distinctions and even misrepresents the process of moving away from malady as "going back" to a former state of health. It does not invite important nuances needed to distinguish between biomedical, phenomenological, and social perspectives. In addition, I claim that there are many conditions where we are making use of the concept of recovery, although the person recovered from the condition in question, has not regained the same degree of soundness. I show how the concept of recovery leads to conceptual discrepancies that can result in worsening patients' conditions. To gain a fuller understanding, I propose to rethink the direction of the process in question. I define the process of moving away from malady as a move forward towards a new state of soundness. I also suggest three terms, corresponding to different perspectives, to describe this movement forward: 'curing' (biomedical perspective), 'healing' (first-person perspective), and 'habilitating' (social perspective). This new terminology provides a more nuanced understanding of the states of both malady and soundness and an attentiveness as to how they differ and relate.
CITATION STYLE
Friedman, Y. (2021). On recovery: re-directing the concept by differentiation of its meanings. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 24(3), 389–399. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10014-7
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