Conditiones non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate: the problem of the equivalence of Locke’s and Nozick’s provisos

Abstract

Although inspired by Locke in formulating his own theory of property, Nozick requires one rather than three provisos (or conditions) for the validity of original acquisitions. This difference raises the question of whether Nozick’s interpretation of Locke’s provisos is correct or, alternatively, the English philosopher unnecessarily multiplied the provisos. The present paper examines this problem by applying the respective provisos to different hypothetical situations. We will argue that Nozick’s proviso is almost as effective as Locke’s three provisos in preserving the rights or opportunities of third parties. However, we will also argue that Nozick’s proviso is unable to deal with certain difficulties arising from the exploitation of natural resources, which can be dealt with by Locke’s spoilage proviso.