Distributing Some, but Not All, Rights of Citizenship According to Ius Sanguinis

Abstract

I overall agree with Dumbrava’s argument that ius sanguinis is unable to cope with the diversification of family structures and is not that morally appealing to begin with, I disagree with him on the details, especially with his background assumption that family ties (although not exclusively genetic, as it is presently the case) must play a salient role in the distribution of citizenship – although in the second part of this contribution I do offer a potential defence of his view against what is probably the strongest objection to his argument, which is that the abolishment of ius sanguinis would split families apart. The main question is: Why should we insist on ius sanguinis except because it would ensure that everyone’s human right to citizenship is satisfied? And insofar as statelessness can be equally avoided via ius soli, why should blood ties create an entitlement to citizenship?