Non-universal arguments under the european convention on human rights

Abstract

It is popular to view international human rights law as universal. In a normative sense, human rights universality refers to certain qualities of human rights norms. These qualities have long been under attack, most recently by what is called here human rights nationalism. The main point made in this article is that some of the criticism levelled against normative human rights universality can be accommodated through interpretation. To this end, non-universality of human rights is judicially created (argumentative non-universality). This article offers an analysis of argumentative non-universality in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It shows that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) operationalizes argumentative non-universality through a conception of asymmetric protection, by using context as a difference-making fact and by allowing, in certain cases, for a decentralized interpretation of rights under the ECHR. As argued here, resorting to argumentative non-universality sometimes makes sense because non-universality takes seriously the fact that individual freedom is, to some extent, socially and politically conditioned. Furthermore, non-universality allows for reasonable interpretive pluralism, and it contributes to the institutional legitimacy of the ECtHR. In conclusion, the ECtHR is, rightly so, an 'interpreter of universality' (as quoted by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque) as it is an interpreter of the non-universality of convention rights.