Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Normative Guidance

Abstract

In Practical Ethics, Peter Singer rejects the notion that ethics is "an ideal system which is all very noble in theory but no good in practice." [2] Singer identifies deontological approaches to ethics, such as rights theories, as impractical and as having to "rescue" themselves from their inapplicability to moral issues in the real world through the introduction of "complexities" such as formulating very detailed rules or establishing ranking structures for rules. He argues that utilitarianism does not start with rules but with goals, and thus has greater normative specificity because actions are prescribed or proscribed based on "the extent to which they further these goals." [3] Utilitarianism, Singer argues, is "untouched by the complexities" required to make deontological moral theories--including rights theory--applicable in concrete moral situations.[4] According to Singer, "[t]he classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it produces as much or more of an increase in the happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action, and wrong if it does not."