Nishida and the Phenomenology of Self-Awareness

Abstract

Nishida Kitarō shared with phenomenologists a concern to account for experience as it is lived, prior to how it is described objectively. His philosophy implies the phenomenological sense of experience, consciousness and self-awareness as dimensions of illuminating or revealing things. His engagement with Husserl in particular guided much of his questioning and criticisms of the centrality of intentionality and of reflective self-awareness. This chapter shows why his critique of Husserl is mistaken, but also indicates how Nishida contributes to the phenomenology of self-awareness. His notion of awareness as inherently reflexive or self-mirroring helps clarify the connection between pre-reflective awareness and reflection and the connection between awareness and the role of a self. Other themes in Nishida’s philosophy, such as the practice of awareness in engaged bodily action, hold promise for further phenomenological investigation.