Moral economics

Abstract

An adequate normative economics – one that is consistent with recent developments in our discipline (and in philosophy and psychology) and that resonates with widely held moral intuitions – will have to address the following challenges. First, utility cannot be both the basis of our predictions of economic behaviour and the evaluation of the outcomes of this behaviour. Second, we need to conceive of individual well-being and other desiderata in ways that are interpersonally comparable and that go beyond efficiency and fairness. Third, the representation of the economy as a ‘morality-free zone’ (requiring that contracts, including employment contracts, are complete) must give way to a recognition of the unaccountable exercise of power by private actors, even in a perfectly competitive equilibrium, and the way that this may violate democratic principles and limit the freedom and compromise the dignity of other actors. Fourth, the commitment to ‘liberal neutrality’ (thereby sidestepping the evaluation of preferences) and the related assumption of ‘unrestricted preferences’ in mechanism design and public policy must be abandoned, making room for a concern about the nature of our preferences and the ways that institutions shape our values.