Rethinking the imperative mandate: Toward a better balance between independence and accountability

Abstract

Two of the founding principles of representative governments—the independence of elected representatives and popular accountability—are notoriously in tension. The more independent representatives are, the less citizens can exercise control over them. This article defends an institutional proposal—semi-directed mandates—aiming to capture the main concerns of both advocates and critics of imperative mandates and to strike a better balance between independence and accountability than the one usually prevailing in contemporary representative governments. The proposal consists of (i) asking candidates or parties to put forward key priorities before the election; (ii) allowing voters to give a more specific mandate to their representatives, and (iii) allowing them to revoke the mandate in case of betrayal of key promises unless they can offer convincing justifications for departing from their mandate. More flexible than the traditional imperative mandate, this proposal also preserves the benefits of a partial division of political labor. It, therefore, seems better suited to the typical circumstances of mass democracies.