Moving Target Defense Considerations in Real-Time Safety-and Mission-Critical Systems

Abstract

Moving-Target defenses (MTDs) have been widely studied for common general-purpose and enterprise-computing applications. Indeed, such work has produced highly effective, low-overhead defenses that are now commonly deployed in many systems today. One application space that has seen comparatively little focus is that of safety-and mission-critical systems, which are often real-Time systems (RTS) with temporal requirements. Furthermore, such systems are increasingly being targeted by attackers, such as in industrial control systems (ICS), including power grids. The strict timing requirements of these systems presents a different design objective than is common in general-purpose applications-systems should be designed around the worst-case performance, rather than the average case. Perhaps in part due to these alternative design considerations, many real-Time systems have not benefited from much of the work on software security that common general-purpose and enterprise applications have, despite the ubiquity of real-Time systems that actively control so many applications we as a society have come to rely on, from power generation and distribution, to automotive and avionic applications, and many others. This paper explores the application of moving-Target defenses in the context of real-Time systems. In particular, the worst-case performance of several address-space randomization defenses are evaluated to study the implications of such designs in real-Time applications. These results suggest that current moving-Target defenses, while performant in the average case, can exhibit significant tail latencies, which can be problematic in real-Time applications, especially if such overheads are not considered in the design and analysis of the system. These results inform future research directions for moving-Target defenses in real-Time applications.