Delusions and epistemic style: a neurodiversity approach to reasoning in schizophrenia

Abstract

Reasoning that leads to delusions—especially in schizophrenia—appears beyond the bounds of sense, profoundly inaccessible. By analyzing empirical research on reasoning that supports delusions in schizophrenia, I demonstrate that such reasoning can be made intelligible at the personal level. Specifically, I propose that these empirical findings can be positively characterized as reflecting a distinctive epistemic style—a characteristic implementation of reason rather than its absence. Delusion-supporting reasoning in schizophrenia can be understood as expressing epistemic values and preferences characteristic of a maverick epistemic personality. As such, it is substantially intelligible in light of these underlying values. Further, I argue that the presence of this epistemic style in individuals with schizophrenia can itself be understood in light of their anomalous experiences and social exclusion. This view contributes to reducing stigma and provides new resources for theorizing non-standard interactions with evidence within the neurodiversity paradigm.