The winner of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) competition, Rijndael, strongly resists mathematical cryptanalysis. However, side channel attacks such as differential power analysis and template attacks break many AES implementations. We propose a cheap and effective countermeasure that exploits the diversity of algorithms consistent with Rijndael’s general design philosophy. The secrecy of the algorithm settings acts as a second key that the adversary must learn to mount popular side channel attacks. Furthermore, because they satisfy Rijndael’s security arguments, these algorithms resist cryptanalytic attacks. Concretely, we design a 72-bit space of SubBytes variants and a 36-bit space of ShiftRows variants. We investigate the mathematical strength provided by these variants, generate them in SageMath, and study their impact on differential power analysis and template attacks against fieldprogrammable gate arrays (FPGAs) by analyzing power traces from the DPA Contest v2 public dataset.
CITATION STYLE
Spain, M., & Varia, M. (2016). Diversity within the Rijndael design principles for resistance to differential power analysis. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10052 LNCS, pp. 71–87). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_5
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