The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results against DAB our Opinionation or Indifference Theorem is a purely synchronic one that depends in no way of the properties of Jeffrey conditionalization.
Costa, H. A., Collins, J., & Levi, I. (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis, 55(1), 2. https://doi.org/10.2307/3328612