Abstract
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
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CITATION STYLE
Chen, X., Doerr, B., Hu, X., Ma, W., Van Stee, R., & Winzen, C. (2012). The price of anarchy for selfish ring routing is two. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7695 LNCS, pp. 420–433). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_31
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