Intrusion Detection System for Multilayer-Controlled Power Electronics-Dominated Grid

Abstract

This article presents an intrusion detection system (IDS) for a multi-layer-controlled power electronics-dominated grid (PEDG). This IDS improves the situational awareness of PEDG against malicious set-points from a compromised upper control layer. Firstly, a mathematical theory is developed for deriving a safe operation region. This mathematical theory extends the stability margins inferred from P-V curves to the abstract concept of morphisms. Particularly, there are two morphisms for each point of common coupling (PCC) bus when operating in the safe operation region: (Morphism 1) PCC bus voltage mapped to network set-points, and (Morphism 2) network set-points mapped to PCC bus voltage. Morphism 1 is used for anomaly detection. Explicitly, observation of a non-zero imaginary-part in the PCC voltage L_2 norm is evidence of an anomaly. Morphism 2 is utilized for independent decision making at the primary layer of the dispersed energy generator (DEG) during intrusion scenarios. Morphism 2 is an alternative for the secondary layer when the dispatched set-points are not trusted. The theoretical analysis is verified by several case studies to substantiate the situational awareness against malicious set-points and consequently enhancing the cybersecurity aspects of the PEDG.