Do Industry Specialist Audit Firms Influence Real Earnings Management? The Role of Auditor Independence

Abstract

In this study, we provide empirical evidence on how the relationship between industry specialist auditors and real earnings management (REM) is moderated by the auditors’ independence. From a sample of Malaysian listed companies for the period 2009 to 2016, the results indicate that companies with specialist auditors are less likely to practise REM. However, this negative association is less pronounced when the independence of the specialist auditor is low, suggesting that the presence of economic bonding between the specialist auditor and the client may allow the auditor to become sufficiently lax to align with the interests of an economically important auditee. Our findings remain robust after controlling for endogeneity and self-selection bias and performing several further analyses. This study is the first to prove that auditor independence can moderate the effectiveness of industry specialist auditors in mitigating REM practices. The results have implications for policy makers to enhance the current regulation structure of auditing and accounting professions. The results also provide new insights into the association between audit quality, REM and auditor independence in an emerging economy.