A novel pricing mechanism for user coalition in blockchain

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Abstract

As the blockchain platform is widely used as a new trading way, both participants and transaction volume in the blockchain projects have been growing by leaps and bounds. The generic mechanisms of ranking transaction priorities are heavily dependent on the transaction fees the users append into each transaction; then, all transactions are ranked in the nonincreasing order according to the transaction fee amounts, and the selected transactions will be packed into a new created block in order based on the ranking results. However, more complex influence factors more than transaction fees on transaction priority ranking results are not taken into consideration in the generic transaction priority ranking mechanisms, and a single user is the objective to create transactions in these mechanisms. In order to optimize the generic transaction priority ranking mechanisms and enrich transaction creation modes, a novel user-coalition-based transaction pricing mechanism (UCTPM) is proposed, and the user coalition quality score, user coalition contribution degree, and the transaction type demand degree are formulated and introduced into the UCTPM mechanism. Our research findings indicate that the UCTPM mechanism satisfies the economic attributes of budget balanced, individual rationality, and incentive compatibility when the user coalition contribution degree increases through theoretical proof and experimental analysis. Moreover, the UCTPM mechanism allows all the transactions to be processed more efficiently by experimental analysis.

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APA

Jiang, Y., Liu, X., & Dai, J. (2020). A novel pricing mechanism for user coalition in blockchain. Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/8885179

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