Abstract
Schnorr’s preprocessing algorithms [6, 7) are designed to speed up the ‘random’ exponentiation often performed by the prover/signer in identification and signature schemes. In this paper, an attack on these preprocessing algorithms is presented. For the proposed parameters, the attack requires about 231 steps, and 700 identifications or signatures to retrieve the secret key. Here the underlying scheme may be Schnorr, Brickell-McCurley, ElGamal or DSS.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
de Rooij, P. (1994). On Schnorr’s preprocessing for digital signature schemes. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 765 LNCS, pp. 435–439). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48285-7_37
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