The unrealistic realist philosophy. The ontology of econometrics revisited

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Abstract

The argument put forth in this article shows that the hitherto scientific-realist approaches to econometrics are incongruent with the realistically reconstructed empirical macroeconomics. The SR approaches share in common being realist about the relations depicted by (successful) models. The economic models of data are sensitive to minor changes in sample and estimating methods what creates the 'emerging contrary result' phenomenon: the community of econometricians accept models that are inconsistent. Being SR about econometrics equals committing oneself to the following trilemma: (1) it is feasible to indicate the successful models that rightly isolate/idealize the regularities of the economy (the knowledge thesis); (2) econometric models are about the economic world (the independence thesis); and, at least in some areas of application, (3) successful econometric models contradict each other.

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Maziarz, M. (2019). The unrealistic realist philosophy. The ontology of econometrics revisited. Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, 13(1), 39–64. https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10731

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