The epistemology of Deep Brain Stimulation and neuronal pathophysiology

Abstract

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a remarkable therapy succeeding where all manner of pharmacological manipulations and brain transplants fail. The success of DBS has resurrected the relevance of electrophysiology and dynamics on the order of milliseconds. Despite the remarkable effects of DBS, its mechanisms of action are largely unknown. There has been an expanding catalogue of various neuronal and neural responses to DBS or DBS-like stimulation but no clear conceptual encompassing explanatory scheme has emerged despite the technological prowess and intellectual sophistication of the scientists involved. Something is amiss. If the scientific observations are sound, then why has there not been more progress? The alternative is that it may be the hypotheses that frame the questions are at fault as well as the methods of inference (logic) used to validate the hypotheses. An analysis of the past and current notions of the DBS mechanisms of action is the subject in order to identify the presuppositions (premises) and logical fallacies that may be at fault. The hope is that these problems will be avoided in the future so the DBS can realize its full potential quickly. In this regard, the discussion of the methods of inference and presuppositions that underlie many current notions is no different then a critique of experimental methods common in scientific discussions and consequently, examinations of the epistemology and logic are appropriate. This analysis is in keeping with the growing appreciation among scientists and philosophers of science, the scientific observations (data) to not "speak for themselves" nor is the scientific method self-evidently true and that consideration of the underlying inferential methods is necessary. © 2012 Montgomery.