We study how to construct efficient tweakable block ciphers in the Random Permutation model, where all parties have access to public random permutation oracles. We propose a construction that combines, more efficiently than by mere black-box composition, the CLRW construction (which turns a traditional block cipher into a tweakable block cipher) of Landecker et al. (CRYPTO 2012) and the iterated Even- Mansour construction (which turns a tuple of public permutations into a traditional block cipher) that has received considerable attention since the work of Bogdanov et al. (EUROCRYPT 2012). More concretely, we introduce the (one-round) tweakable Even-Mansour (TEM) cipher, constructed from a single n-bit permutation P and a uniform and almost XOR-universal family of hash functions (Hk) from some tweak space to {0, 1}n, and defined as (Formula presented.), where k is the key, t is the tweak, and x is the n-bit message, as well as its generalization obtained by cascading r independently keyed rounds of this construction. Our main result is a security bound up to approximately 22n/3 adversarial queries against adaptive chosen-plaintext and ciphertext distinguishers for the two-round TEM construction, using Patarin’s H-coefficients technique. We also provide an analysis based on the coupling technique showing that asymptotically, as the number of rounds r grows, the security provided by the r-round TEM construction approaches the informationtheoretic bound of 2n adversarial queries.
CITATION STYLE
Cogliati, B., Lampe, R., & Seurin, Y. (2015). Tweaking even-Mansour ciphers. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9215, pp. 189–208). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_9
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