This article analyzes the effect of stricter enforcement of the eligibility criteria in the Swedish sickness insurance (SI) system. In 2008, time-restricted assessments of the individual's working capacity on the 91st and 181st sick day was introduced. Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental feature of the intervention, I find a large and significant increased exit rate around the 181-day assessment. The impact is the result of longer spells outside SI-benefits, indicating that the stricter rules create disincentives to report sick. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Hägglund, P. (2013). Do time limits in the sickness insurance system increase return to work? Empirical Economics, 45(1), 567–582. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-012-0618-9
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