The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies: Kidnap rates and the Arellano-Félix Organization

Abstract

Kingpin strategies- the targeting of the top-levels of terrorist or drug trafficking organization hierarchies- has become a centerpiece of US and Mexican efforts to combat drug trafficking. This study addresses the unintended consequences of these strategies by assessing the impact of the arrest or deaths of Arellano Felix Organization leaders on kidnap and homicide levels from the late 1990's to 2011. Based on the study, the arrest of important AFO "lieutenants" increased kidnap rates. Arrests or the deaths of organization "kingpins" did not result in increased homicides or kidnappings, if respected successors were ready to fill leadership vacuums. When leadership succession was in question, the arrest of "kingpins" did result in internecine conflict and thus increased homicide and kidnapping rates. Following internecine conflict, kidnap and homicide rates dropped, but not to pre-conflict levels. This is likely attributable to the use of kidnapping and homicide as a dispute resolution mechanism in the growing Tijuana consumer drug market. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.